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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO AMEND
WITHOUT SUPPORTING ITS DECISION WITH ANALYSIS
As a general rule, a trial court considering a motion to amend has an affirmative

obligation to explain its reasoning before either granting or denying the motion. In Kelly v.
Hard Money Funding. Inc.. 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734, this Court "reiterate[d] the wellaccepted rule that it is a per se abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to explain its
decision regarding a motion to amend with reference to the appropriate principles of law or
the factual circumstances that necessitate a particular result." Id. at ^f42 (emphasis added)
(citing Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Development. 970P.2d 1273,1281-82 (Utah
1998); Trethewav v. Furstenau. 2001 UT App 400, ^16, 40 P.3d 649).
Appellee Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints (CPB) implicitly acknowledges that the denial of the motion to amend at issue
here did not contain any supporting analysis, but nevertheless argues that the denial was
appropriate because the reasons for denying the motion to amend were "apparent." CPB
Brief at 11. It is true that the Utah Supreme Court did hold in Aurora. Credit Services that
a motion to amend can be denied without analysis if the grounds for denial are apparent. Id.
at 1282. In relying on this decision, however, CPB neglects to point out that the Aurora
Credit Services court went on to hold that the grounds for denial were not apparent in that
case, and therefore ordered the trial court to reconsider the motion on its merits. Id.
Regardless, the Aurora Credit Services court cited the decision of the Tenth Circuit
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in Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho. 31 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that
a denial of a motion to amend that is not properly supported by analysis can be proper if the
grounds for denial were apparent, and Pallottino is particularly instructive here. In Pallottino,
the court explained this rule by noting that the grounds for denial in that case were "clear
from the record." IcL at 1027. Specifically, the plaintiffs claims in that case had already
been dismissed as a matter of law on immunity grounds, and the proposed amendment did
not offer any new evidence that would have altered the analysis. Id
The situation in Pallotino is a far-cry from the scenario now before this Court. There
has been no dismissal as a matter of law in this case, and the proposed amendment therefore
isn't subject to any prior ruling that would make its resolution a mere formality. Further,
unlike the claim at issue in Pallottino, there is no single "apparent" reason for this denial that
is "clear from the record." Instead, even CPB's brief is forced to take a shotgun approach
to explaining the ruling. In explaining why it thinks that the trial court denied the motion to
amend, for example, CPB alternatively argues that it might have been because: (1) the motion
to amend wasn't properly supported with particularized analysis (CPB Brief at 12); (2)
Whited never addressed the prejudice prong of the motion to amend analysis (CPB Brief at
13); (3) Whited never addressed the timeliness of the motion to amend (CPB Brief at 13); (4)
the motion to amend was untimely (CPB Brief at 12-13); or (5) the motion to amend was
futile (CPB Brief at 14-17).
Though any of these five arguments may or may not have merit, the fact is that the
trial court did not mention any of them in its analysis, nor did it mention any other particular
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reason either. As such, CPB's inability to identify or focus on a single reason that "clearly"
explains what the trial court actually did betrays its own position. Again, the question what
the trial court could have been thinking; the question is what the trial court actually was
thinking. CPB's failure to identify anything more particular than a list of five possible
reasons therefore strikes at the heart of its own clarity-based argument.
This Court should decline the invitation to get involved in a guessing game regarding
the trial court's actual intentions, and should instead follow its "well-accepted" precedent and
hold that it was a per se abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend in this case without
offering supportive analysis.
II.
WHITED DID NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS THE PREJUDICE
OR TIMELINESS ISSUES IN HIS MOTION TO AMEND.
CPB also argues that Whited's motion to amend was improper because he "never
discussed the timing of the motion" or the "prejudice to CPB" in his motion to amend.
CPB's Brief at 13. The problem with this argument is that it runs afoul of direct precedent
from this Court. In Kelly, this Court definitively held that there is no set factor or set list of
factors that must be pleaded and ruled on in a Rule 15 analysis. Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at
TJ38-42. Instead, this Court emphasized that a motion to amend can be granted or denied
based on even a single factor. Thus, CPB's suggestion that Whited was required to have
discussed any particular aspect of the case in filing the motion to amend is simply incorrect
as a matter of law.
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III.

THE MOTION TO AMEND IN THIS CASE WAS NOT UNTIMELY.
CPB suggests that the motion to amend that was filed in this case was filed "after an

extensive delay" and should be denied on that basis alone. CPB's Brief at 12. In Kelly, this
Court stated that a motion to amend is typically deemed untimely when it is either filed (1)
"in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of
discovery, on the eve of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been
entered," or (2) when it is filed "several years into the litigation." Id. at ffi[29-30.
As indicated in CPB's brief, the motion to amend at issue was filed on March 2,2006,
and sought to add a number of parties that were first identified by CPB on June 16, 2005.
CPB's Brief at 5-6. There has been no allegation that Whited was aware of these additional
parties' identities at any time prior. To the extent that there was a "delay" in filing the
motion, this delay would therefore constitute a grand total of nine months, which is a far cry
from the "several years" rule identified in Kelly.
Further, CPB also acknowledges that litigation was still ongoing when the motion to
amend was filed. Specifically, the trial court had entered a scheduling order on December
4, 2005, and that there was only "an anticipated trial date of July 2007." CPB Brief at 6
(emphasis added). Indeed, that same scheduling order set forth a deadline for amending the
pleadings, a deadline that Whited met. It therefore simply cannot be said that this case was
in the "advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of
discovery, on the eve of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been
entered." Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at f29. Given this, CPB's assertion that there was
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anything untimely about this motion is simply incorrect.
IV.

THE REASONS FOR THIS MOTION TO AMEND ARE CLEAR.
Motions are not filed in isolation or in a vacuum, but are instead filed as a result of

the procedural and factual developments in a case. Here, Whited sought leave to amend his
complaint for a very specific reason: to join "additional parties who have an interest in the
well which is the basis for this lawsuit." R. at 576-77. The reason for this was clear to all
involved: namely, CPB had earlier opposed Whited's Rule 34 inspection request on the very
specific basis that these particular parties were not party to this lawsuit. Given this, extensive
elaboration was not necessary in the Rule 15 motion, insofar as it was well understood that
Whited was simply trying to remove the obstacle that CPB had already raised to the Rule 34
motion CPB's assertion that Whited has somehow not explained the basis for his Rule 15
request is disingenuous and incorrect.
V.

THIS MOTION TO AMEND WAS NOT FUTILE.
Finally, CPB asserts that this motion to amend can be denied because it was futile.

There are three problems with this argument.
First, it is well accepted that the decision whether to deny or grant a motion to amend
rests within the discretion of the trial court. As discussed above, the trial court here did not
offer any basis for denying this motion to amend. Thus, Whited, CPB, and this Court are all
left to guess at the trial court's thinking. Regardless, the claim that the motion was "futile"
is necessarily based upon the assertion that Whited could not have prevailed on his claims
had the motion to amend been granted. In other words, CPB's position is that because the
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quantum of evidence that it presented at the earlier hearing seemed to indicate that the water
sources were unrelated, it could not be possible that placing monitors in the wells would
produce different results. While the evidence may or may not suggest this, at least one expert
involved in the case-Dr. Kip Solomon, who is a trained geologist-believes that there is a
connection. Though CPB has attacked his theories, CPB has yet to have Dr. Solomon
disqualified from testifying as an expert in this case. Thus, CPB has essentially asked this
Court to rule as a matter of law that Dr. Kip Solomon's opinions aren't just wrong based on
the evidence currently before it, but also that they could not even possibly be correct. This
Court is a court of law, not of geology, and it should not accept the invitation to play the part
of scientific arbiter in this case.
Second, CPB's argument is circular. Specifically, CPB points to Whited's lack of
evidence as the basis for its futility argument, while at the same time ignoring the fact that
Whited' s stated reason for requesting a Rule 34 inspection was to procure that very evidence.
This is akin to a business refusing to provide documents in a civil dispute, and yet then
requesting a dismissal based on the fact that the other side hadn't been able to identify any
internal documents that supported its position. More specifically, this would be akin to a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case refusing to submit to an independent medical exam,
and yet then arguing that the defendant's experts theories could be legally dismissed because
they were unsupported by observations of her own actual physical condition.
In order for the trial court (and by extension this Court) to have a proper foundation
for any factual rulings on this case, Whited needs to be allowed to conduct the reasonable
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discovery that he has requested. Without such discovery, the evidence will continue to be
one-sided, and it will obviously continue to favor the one and only party with access to the
evidence in question-all in clear contravention of the two-party nature of our adversarial
system. Under such circumstances, it is simply not equitable nor fair for CPB to request a
dismissal of Whited's case based upon nothing more than its own refusal to allow Whited
access to conduct meaningful discovery.
Third, CPBfs excoriation of Dr. Solomonfs "untested theory'1 makes Whited's point for
him. There is no way for Dr. Solomon to test the theory without the discovery that was
requested. This is amply clear from both the record below and the brief in chief. All of the
other arguments CPB makes with respect to stem from the fact that no discovery has been
allowed. Of course Dr. Solomon's theory is untested; CPB refuses to allow access to the data
that would allow such testing, and the District Court refused to make CPB produce that data.
The references to the findings made as a result of the evidentiary hearings
mischaracterizes those findings. The district court did not make any findings regarding the
presence or lack of hydrological connection. Rather, it found that Mr. Whited failed to
produce up to that point any evidence of such a connection that would tend to support the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. ". . . Whited has not placed before this Court any
empirical evidence to establish a 'measurable connection' between the water supplying the
CPB wells and that supplying his points of diversion ....*' (Finding 16, R. 399, emphasis
supplied). "Whited has failed to offer any empirical evidence under either theory of
connection advanced to establish the existence of a measurable connection between the
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underground water supplying CPB's water rights and the water supplying Whited's surface
water rights." (Conclusion 6, R. 401, emphasis supplied).
Note that the finding and conclusion do not state that there is no connection between
the water rights; rather, they simply state that no evidence of the same has been presented.
This is typical and appropriate for a finding and conclusion made in connection with a
motion for preliminary injunction. Given that the discovery phase after such a motion but
before trial normally yields evidence, the result at trial could be the opposite. But only if the
discovery is permitted to occur.
This underscores why the "findings" below are a red herring: they were held in
connection with Mr. Whited's pursuit of a preliminary injunction, not as a result of a fully
developed record from discovery. The only purpose that such findings and conclusions have
is to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue. They are always subject to
modification based upon evidence adduced through the discovery process. Rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. To rely on them for the proposition of "been there, done that" is
therefore disingenuous.
CPB 's argument that Whited is improperly arguing the denial of the discovery motion
in connection with this appeal of the denial of his motion to amend is meritless. CPB opened
the door to this argument below by specifically invoking the denial of the discovery motion
as a reason for denying a motion to amend. This has been addressed in detail in the brief in
chief.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court to
deny the motion to amend and the motion to compel.
DATED this _k£_day of January, 2007.
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